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Research Article
The psychology of human communication has primarily 
focused on how people convey messages to each other 
using elaborate systems of conventions, including lan-
guage, facial expressions, and gestures. But people can 
also communicate surprisingly effectively even with few 
conventions in common—when they have to jointly cre-
ate communicative conventions on the spot. We call these 
instantaneous conventions. Vivid examples of this ability 
are recorded in stories of first contact between different 
cultures. For example, on encountering the explorer 
James Cook, two Fuegian islanders stepped forward to 
display and then throw aside large sticks, gestures that 
Cook interpreted as indicating peaceful intentions. Indeed, 
the Fuegians and Cook were soon exchanging gifts and 
eating together on board ship (Hough, 1994). This ability 
also appears to be at work when pidgins naturally develop 
between adult communities lacking a common linguistic 
background (e.g., the 18th-century creation of Russenorsk 
by Russian traders and Norwegian fisherman to facilitate 
seasonal bartering; Jahr, 1996) and in deaf children’s 
invention of home-sign gestures to communicate with 
hearing caregivers (Goldin-Meadow & Feldman, 1977). 
More prosaically, young children without a common lan-
guage can, nonetheless, communicate well enough for 
complex social play (Protassova, 1992).
How is such communicative kick-starting possible? We 
explored the creation of instantaneous conventions using 
an experimental paradigm involving a common task, a 
simplified environment, and the most minimal possible 
communicative signals. A natural intuition about experi-
mental studies of spontaneous conventions is that new 
conventions will be shaped by preexisting conventions 
or that new, stable conventions will rapidly form during 
the experiment. A critical test for the instantaneous nature 
of conventions observed in our paradigm, then, is that 
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Abstract
Humans can communicate even with few existing conventions in common (e.g., when they lack a shared language). 
We explored what makes this phenomenon possible with a nonlinguistic experimental task requiring participants 
to coordinate toward a common goal. We observed participants creating new communicative conventions using the 
most minimal possible signals. These conventions, furthermore, changed on a trial-by-trial basis in response to shared 
environmental and task constraints. Strikingly, as a result, signals of the same form successfully conveyed contradictory 
messages from trial to trial. Such behavior is evidence for the involvement of what we term joint inference, in which 
social interactants spontaneously infer the most sensible communicative convention in light of the common ground 
between them. Joint inference may help to elucidate how communicative conventions emerge instantaneously and 
how they are modified and reshaped into the elaborate systems of conventions involved in human communication, 
including natural languages.
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they should flexibly change to fit the communicative con-
straint of the moment. Ideally, the same signal might suc-
cessfully convey contradictory messages from trial to 
trial, depending on task and environmental constraints.
We drew on Lewis’s (1969) legacy of analyzing signal-
ing games to elucidate principles of communication. 
Recently, laboratory experimental-semiotics games (e.g., 
Galantucci, 2005; Scott-Phillips, Kirby, & Ritchie, 2009; for 
a review, see Galantucci & Garrod, 2011) have helped 
researchers explore the early emergence of signaling 
conventions among paired or grouped participants over 
successive interactions. Many such studies employ 
Pictionary-style tasks, in which participants initially pro-
duce iconic representations of meanings; over time, these 
signals evolve into new graphical signs with different 
semiotic properties (e.g., becoming simpler and more 
symbolic; Fay, Ellison, & Garrod, 2014). In a complemen-
tary paradigm, iterated-learning experiments focus on 
how structural design features of language may emerge 
from prespecified and arbitrary signal-meaning mappings, 
which have been subsequently shaped by transmission 
through chains of individual learners (e.g., Kirby, Cornish, 
& Smith, 2008; Verhoef, Kirby, & de Boer, 2015; for a 
review, see Tamariz & Kirby, 2016). These important dis-
coveries show how conventions may be iteratively built 
up across time through communicative interaction or cul-
tural transmission. By contrast, we focused on how con-
ventions may be instantaneously created in the 
moment—without any conventionalized, iconically based, 
or prespecified mappings from which to bootstrap them.
The same processes underpinning instantaneous 
conventions may also help explain how established 
conventions can be used with great flexibility (e.g., Clark, 
1996; Grice, 1975). For instance, conversational partners 
jointly coordinate and adapt lexical conventions when 
referring to novel objects (Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986), 
and such choices may be shaped and reshaped over suc-
cessive interactions (Brennan & Clark, 1996; see also 
Clark & Brennan, 1991). Over time, initially flexible com-
municative conventions may become increasingly 
entrenched, both during acquisition and use and through 
generations of cultural evolution.
Before considering such implications, however, we 
introduce our paradigm for exploring instantaneous 
conventions and whether people can successfully “flip” a 
signal’s conventional meaning in light of changing 
communicative and task constraints.
Experiment 1: Creation of Signaling 
Conventions in a Novel Paradigm
Our initial experiment tested whether spontaneous con-
ventions could be created and adapted in an experimen-
tal task in which adult participants could not use any 
preexisting languages, familiar gestures, iconic signs, 
established symbols, or other standard communicative 
systems to coordinate toward a goal.
Method
Participants. Twenty-four undergraduates from the 
University of Warwick—with self-reported normal or cor-
rected-to-normal vision, normal hearing, and good flu-
ency in English (or better)—were recruited through an 
online participant-recruitment panel. We recruited for 24 
spaces at the group session to ensure that there would be 
18 participants in attendance, which we projected would 
be sufficient for a strong predicted effect. Two partici-
pants were dismissed partway through performing the 
experimental task because of problems in reestablishing 
a network connection; their data were excluded from 
analyses. (These 2 participants observed only 8 of the 64 
experimental trials.) After a corresponding delay, the 
remaining 22 participants (10 female, 12 male; mean age = 
20.6 years, SD = 1.8) resumed and completed the task. All 
participants were paid £10.
Communication paradigm. We developed an inter-
active two-player computer game in which both partners 
viewed a 3-D-simulated scene, but each saw the scene 
from the opposite visual perspective (illustrated in Fig. 1). 
The game environment consisted of three boxes, each 
containing either a reward (banana) or nonreward (scor-
pion). The number of rewards and the rewards’ locations 
in the boxes, as well as other scene variables, changed 
from trial to trial. One partner played the role of sender, 
and the other played as a receiver: They shared the joint 
task of uncovering as many rewards as possible while 
avoiding nonrewards.
Contents of the boxes were visible only to the sender 
by means of panels that slid open on the side of the box 
facing the sender (see Fig. 1). However, a set of shadows 
(impressions of bananas and scorpions, embedded in the 
virtual ground) was sometimes mutually visible to both 
players (e.g., as in Fig. 1b). The shape and number of 
these shadows corresponded to the number of scorpions 
and bananas inside the three boxes on that trial. On other 
trials, however, a wall prevented the receiver from seeing 
these shadows (as in Fig. 1a). The presence or absence of 
the wall occluding the shadows thus served as a manipu-
lation of the common ground between sender and 
receiver as to the quantities of rewards within the scene. 
We expected participants to be sensitive to this manipu-
lation, although referential communication studies 
(Hanna, Tanenhaus, & Trueswell, 2003; Keysar, Bar, Balin, 
& Brauner, 2000) suggest that this kind of provisional 
occluder may sometimes increase the relative difficulty 
of trials, owing to factors in effectively differentiating 
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between what is privileged ground (privately known) 
and common ground.
Although senders had the advantage of seeing inside 
boxes, only receivers were able to choose which boxes 
to open. Successfully accomplishing the joint goal of 
uncovering the most bananas, therefore, required the 
sender to produce some signal conveying the rewards’ 
whereabouts to the receiver, who interpreted the signal 
when choosing boxes on behalf of the pair. To this end, 
the sender manipulated a set of tokens (white disc-
shaped objects) and the receiver manipulated a set of 
axes with a computer mouse. The sender went first in a 
trial and could move any or all tokens onto the top of any 
of the boxes. When the sender was finished placing 
tokens, he or she clicked a “DONE” button to update the 
receiver’s view of the scene. Observing where the sender 
placed tokens, the receiver then placed a single ax onto 
each box that he or she chose to have opened. (As only 
one ax could be used per box, the number of axes in the 
scene also constrained the number of boxes that could 
be chosen.) When the receiver clicked “DONE,” any cho-
sen boxes were then axed, which revealed their contents 
to both players.
On any given trial, the sender had the option not to 
move tokens, and the receiver had the option not to 
select boxes. They might exercise these options if, for 
example, they considered a potential or transmitted sig-
nal to be too unreliable or ambiguous. When this 
b
a
Sender’s View Receiver’s View
Sender’s View Receiver’s View
Fig. 1. Examples of two visual scenes (a, b) from the communication game. Senders and receivers saw the same scenes but from opposite points 
of view. From their respective views, each player could apprehend which aspects of a given scene should be visible to his or her partner, as well 
as which objects were mutually visible to them both. Only senders could see the contents of each of the three boxes (a scorpion or a banana, 
which varied from trial to trial); however, a set of shadows on the ground matched the quantities and types of objects inside the boxes. Though 
always visible to senders, these shadows were (a) sometimes occluded from receivers’ view by a wall and (b) sometimes not. Other objects in the 
scenes—tokens and axes—varied in number depending on the trial type (see the Method for Experiment 1 for more information about these items), 
and a “DONE” button appeared in the upper right corner. For purposes of illustration, the smaller-scale objects shown here have been spaced closer 
together and enlarged (and the grass has been lightened) for clarity.
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occurred, the following text message appeared on their 
partner’s screen: “Your partner did not place anything.” 
This happened infrequently.
An intuitively appealing convention for mapping sig-
nals to meanings in this communication paradigm may be 
to place tokens on the boxes containing rewards (as 
depicted in Fig. 2b).1 Given the appeal of this convention, 
would participants change it flexibly—even reversing the 
meaning from that attached to a previous signal—in light 
of a potentially better mapping in different contexts?
We reasoned that if senders were provided with only 
one token on a trial with two bananas, then a more 
advantageous mapping might be to place the token on 
the box containing the scorpion (i.e., to “mark,” by this 
token placement, the box that has the scorpion)—in con-
tradiction to “marking” one of the boxes containing a 
banana. Adoption of this convention would allow players 
to obtain both bananas rather than just one. Crucially, 
such an “odd-one-out” signal would be sensible in situa-
tions in which the elements of the scene supported this 
inference by both players—for instance, in a situation in 
which it could be commonly known that there were two 
bananas present (as indicated by the shadows) and that 
the sender was limited to one token (cf. Figs. 2a and 2d). 
Invertible Signal:
b
c
a
d
The Scorpion Is
“Here,” It’s the
Odd One Out.
The Banana Is
“Here,” It’s One
of the Rewards.
Same Signal “Flips” its 
Meaning in Different
Contexts.
Fig. 2. Illustration of the main elements of four key scenes (from the sender’s view), along with hypothesized placement of tokens 
as signals. The contents of the three boxes—two bananas and one scorpion—are identical across all four scenes. However, each 
of the scenes in the right-hand panels varies from the critical test scene (a) on precisely one dimension, namely the (b) number of 
tokens, (c) number of axes, or (d) presence of a wall. We predicted that contradictory meanings could be mapped onto the same 
signal (e.g., the placement of a solitary token) if participants flexibly changed conventions in light of these scene variations. We 
expected this to be the case for the comparison of signals between scene (a) and the other three scenes, because these scene varia-
tions change partners’ common ground either for aspects of the scene or for task constraints. That is, between (a) and (d), the wall 
manipulation changes whether or not it is common ground that the shadows are perceptually accessible to both players. The other 
scenes alter common ground for two forms of task constraints: whether the signal can be composed of one or two tokens—compare 
(a) and (b)—and whether the receiver can select one or two boxes (as indicated by the number of axes)—compare (a) and (c). 
If participants’ signaling is spontaneously responsive to these changes, then players may coordinate on the most sensible conven-
tion that is adapted to their common ground in the new situation. Consequently, the same signal can “flip” or invert its meaning, 
depending on communicative context.
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We took such a case to be a critical test of whether con-
ventions spontaneously changed in our experiment.
Similarly, conventions might also be sensitive to restric-
tions on the means to attaining the common goal. For 
instance, the conditions outlined in the previous para-
graph for the hypothesized odd-one-out signal might be 
fulfilled, but it may also be part of common ground that 
the receiver has only one ax (see Fig. 2c)—and thus, the 
pair is limited to obtaining only one banana. Such cir-
cumstances make the odd-one-out signal unnecessary for 
maximal success, which could result in the signal of a 
token’s placement to flip its meaning again from along 
the lines of “this is the odd-one-out item” to “this is one 
of the rewards” (cf. Figs. 2c and 2a). Such an inversion 
would again be indicative of spontaneous conventions in 
lieu of transferring the odd-one-out signaling approach 
to this new context.
The experiment was therefore designed to explore 
whether such invertible signals would emerge across 
these hypothetical scenarios, as depicted in Figure 2. The 
following variables were manipulated: tokens (one or 
two present), rewards (one or two present), axes (one or 
two present), and wall (present or absent). The wall vari-
able manipulated whether both players had the same 
information about reward quantities—this knowledge 
was assumed to be common ground between players 
only when the wall was absent (thus affording both play-
ers a nonoccluded view of the shadows). Crossing all 
factors yielded 16 combinations (2 × 2 × 2 × 2) for speci-
fying the composition of a game scene. Each possibility 
thus constituted a unique trial type, which was presented 
an equal number of times. Locations of rewards and non-
rewards were randomized per trial across the three boxes, 
as were the ordering of reward and nonreward 
shadows.
The specifications for the subset of trial types of key 
interest (corresponding to the four scenes in Fig. 2) are 
summarized in Table 1. By presenting all of the 16 trial 
types an equal number of times, it was equally likely for 
a scene to contain one or two rewards (this was true for 
trials in general, as well as for the subset of trials on which 
the wall appeared). This fact supported the effectiveness 
of the wall manipulation since it precluded the receiver 
from otherwise exploiting probabilistic information about 
reward quantities whenever the wall was present.
Procedure. Participants played the communication game 
over networked computers in the laboratory during the 
same group session. They first received instructions that 
clarified the joint goal of the interaction (collecting as 
many bananas as possible while avoiding scorpions), the 
turn-taking structure (sender goes first, then receiver), 
procedural details (e.g., random matching of new part-
ners per trial, clicking the “DONE” button), the fact that 
the shadows indicate the quantities of rewards, and the 
scene objects (tokens, axes) that can be manipulated by 
each participant according to their role (sender, receiver). 
Participants then completed four practice trials corre-
sponding to two different scene configurations. (These 
scenarios were simple cases involving one token, one 
banana, and two axes—but differed in that one scenario 
did not include the wall, whereas the other did.) Each 
scene configuration was presented twice, as two trials, to 
provide participants with experience of the same scene 
as both a sender and a receiver.
Participants completed 64 trials. Each participant was 
assigned to be a sender or receiver for the first half of the 
trials and was assigned the opposite role for the second 
half. Within each half, each of the 16 trial types was pre-
sented twice in a random order. A new random matching 
of senders and receivers was generated on each trial, 
which resulted in each participant anonymously interact-
ing with several different players across the entirety of 
the game rather than with a fixed partner. Interaction 
therefore transpired both between paired participants 
and within a communicative “community” (i.e., a closed 
group of interacting participants). After completing a 
trial, each sender-receiver dyad watched as the chosen 
boxes were axed open, which revealed their contents.
Results
Participants’ actions were coded into signaling categories. 
For the sender analyses, we refer to participants as hav-
ing marked the particular content of a box (a reward or 
nonreward) if they marked that box itself (by placing a 
token on top of it). Accordingly, sender categories 
reflected whether participants marked all and only 
rewards (i.e., bananas), one of two rewards, or all and 
only nonrewards (i.e., scorpions) or whether they took 
some other action (e.g., not marking any boxes). The 
categories for receivers reflected whether they selected 
Table 1. Definition of the Four Key Trial Types
Trial type
Number 
of tokens
Number 
of rewards
Number 
of axes Wall
Two token 2 2 2 Absent
Inversion 1 2 2 Absent
Wall 1 2 2 Present
One ax 1 2 1 Absent
Note: When the wall was absent, the number of rewards was not only 
known by both partners (individually)—but the manner in which 
the shadows were mutually visible allowed partners to apprehend 
that they shared this information (jointly) as common ground. When 
the wall was present, partners lacked common ground for such 
knowledge about reward quantity. Irrespective of the wall variable, 
however, the number of tokens and number of axes were always 
perceptually evident as common ground between partners.
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all and only marked boxes, one of two marked boxes (if 
applicable), all and only unmarked boxes (if applicable), 
or one of two unmarked boxes or whether they took 
some other action (including no selection). For each trial 
type and with respect to each participant role, the pro-
portion of each participant’s actions that belonged to a 
signaling category was used to derive the corresponding 
mean proportion of the group.
For the various trial types in which there was only one 
banana and one token (i.e., 4 out of the 16 trial types), 
participants consistently placed the token on the box 
containing the banana (mean proportions ranged from 
.95, SE = .03, 95% confidence interval, or CI = [.89, 1.00], 
to 1.00, SE = .00). Having established that marking the 
reward was the clear tendency in these basic cases, we 
focused our analyses on the subset of trials (see Table 1 
and Fig. 2)—all involving two rewards—that critically 
tested whether senders’ signaling patterns were flexible 
across other contexts. First, it was found that the same 
general strategy of marking rewards was also predomi-
nant on two-token trials; the proportion of such trials on 
which senders marked both of the boxes containing 
bananas was near ceiling (M = .98, SE = .02, 95% CI = 
[.93, 1.00]). On inversion trials, which involved the same 
specification of scene variables except that there was 
only one token available, senders’ behavior switched 
strongly to marking the box with the scorpion (M = .91, 
SE = .04, 95% CI = [.82, 1.00]).
This scorpion-marking behavior, however, was moder-
ated by the manipulation of common ground concerning 
reward quantities on wall trials. When the wall precluded 
receivers from knowing how many bananas there were, 
senders on wall trials were distinctly less inclined to mark 
the scorpion (M = .48, SE = .07, 95% CI = [.33, .62]), some-
times marking one of the bananas instead (M = .50, SE = 
.07, 95% CI = [.35, .64]). Finally, on one-ax trials, which 
were the same as inversion trials in all respects save for 
the presence of one ax instead of two, senders again 
modified their signaling, marking one of the bananas 
most of the time (M = .68, SE = .08, 95% CI = [.52, .84]) 
instead of marking the scorpion (M = .32, SE = .08, 95% 
CI = [.16, .48]).
To directly compare signaling across these key trial 
contexts, we analyzed participants’ use of the odd-one-
out signal (see Fig. 3). For senders, use of an odd-one-out 
signal was defined as marking the box containing the 
scorpion; for receivers, use of an odd-one-out signal was 
defined as selecting both of the unmarked boxes (or 
selecting one unmarked box when limited to only one 
ax). Senders’ proportions of odd-one-out signals were 
strongly affected by trial type, as indicated by a one-way 
repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA), F(2.31, 
48.49) = 44.82, p < .001, ηp2 = .68. Planned comparisons 
revealed that, compared with senders’ ubiquitous use of 
the odd-one-out signal on inversion trials, senders’ use of 
odd-one-out signals on the other key trial types was 
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Fig. 3. Mean proportion of trials on which participants used the odd-one-out signal 
in Experiment 1 as a function of trial type, separately for the sender and receiver roles. 
Asterisks indicate significant differences between the critical trial type (inversion) and 
other trial types (p < .0001). Error bars represent ±1 SE.
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sharply reduced—difference between inversion and two-
token trials: M = .89, 95% CI = [.79, .98], p < .001; between 
inversion and wall trials: M = .43, 95% CI = [.26, .60], p < 
.001; and between inversion and one-ax trials: M = .59, 
95% CI = [.40, .78], p < .001. A similar significant pattern 
of findings was seen for receivers (Fig. 3), which reflects 
congruency in signaling approaches for both interac-
tional roles. We stress that the odd-one-out signal was the 
most common response even on the very first relevant 
trial, both for senders and receivers, and that this level of 
responding did not differ significantly with that for later 
trials. Thus, this flip of the interpretation of the signal 
arose instantaneously rather than building up slowly 
across trials.
Discussion
Participants generated shared signaling conventions, 
including the instantaneous emergence of the odd-one-
out signal of marking the scorpion. Comparisons indi-
cated that the selectively strong use of this signal was not 
merely a response to the scenario with two bananas and 
one token. Odd-one-out signals did flexibly appear when 
communicative constraints changed from two available 
tokens to one—but also crucially depended on whether 
the scene permitted as common ground that there were 
two rewards. Without this common ground, the odd-one-
out convention was curtailed. Moreover, players demon-
strated sensitivity to common ground concerning not only 
rewards but also available actions: The presence of a sin-
gle ax indicated that the receiver could open only one 
box, so sender and receiver flipped their signaling 
approach back to marking the banana. This critical role of 
common ground is consistent with its prominence in the-
oretical accounts of coordination (e.g., Schelling, 1960), 
conventions (e.g., Lewis, 1969), and language (e.g., Clark, 
1996).
In sum, across the four key trial types, participants cre-
ated and used invertible signals, felicitously reversing the 
prior meanings of signals of the same form. The implica-
tions of this finding will be considered in the General 
Discussion.
Experiment 2: Signaling Under 
Asynchronous Conditions
While Experiment 1 explored signaling under conditions 
concomitant with real-time communication, Experiment 
2 investigated whether invertible signals appear under 
stringently controlled conditions that preclude interactive 
or outcome-based feedback. The design further con-
trolled for potential ordering effects that could stem from 
participants experiencing the same sequence of ran-
domly ordered trials.
Method
Participants. Two separate groups of 16 participants 
each were needed to instantiate our counterbalanced 
design (see the following section). To ensure this num-
ber of participants would be in attendance, we recruited 
from an online participant panel to fill 21 spaces for each 
of two sessions. Recruits were advised before signing up 
that sessions required a particular configuration of par-
ticipants, and, therefore, there was a possibility that some 
recruits might be dismissed at their session’s start with £3 
compensation.
Six recruits did not attend their session, which left 4 
surplus recruits in attendance (3 in the first session, 1 in 
the second session); accordingly, 4 recruits were ran-
domly selected and dismissed with £3 payment. The 
remaining 32 participants were all undergraduate stu-
dents (15 male, 17 female; mean age = 20.3 years, SD = 
1.9) from the University of Warwick. All self-reported 
having normal or corrected-to-normal vision, normal 
hearing, and good fluency in English (or better). Each 
participant was paid £7 for participating in one of the two 
sessions (which corresponded to different conditions, as 
described in the following section). None of the partici-
pants had taken part in Experiment 1.
Design and procedure. The interactive components of 
the communication game from Experiment 1 were 
removed, and the task was decomposed into two parts: 
(a) a sender condition in which trials consisted only of 
viewing game scenes (from the sender’s view) and gen-
erating signals and (b) a receiver condition in which trials 
consisted only of viewing signals embedded in game 
scenes (from the receiver’s view) and selecting boxes.
The same 16 trial types from Experiment 1 were pre-
sented across four blocks, with each trial type presented 
once per block. Four 16 × 16 Latin squares were used to 
specify 16 unique sequences of 64 trials each to be 
assigned, for each condition, across participants. Each 
Latin square counterbalanced ordinal position, immedi-
ate sequential effects, and remote (second-, third-, fourth-
order, etc.) sequential effects of the 16 trial types within 
each block. Care was also taken to ensure balancing for 
first- and second-order sequential effects introduced by 
the transitions of trials between blocks and to avoid 
immediate repetitions or alternations of the same trial 
type at the end of one block and the beginning of the 
next. (More details on the construction of these Latin 
squares, as well as a table of the full sequences from the 
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experiment, are provided in the Supplemental Material 
available online.)
Participants in the sender condition generated all the 
signals that were used for those in the receiver condition. 
The identical set of trial sequences (specified by the Latin 
squares) for the sender condition was also administered 
in the receiver condition. Off-line, a matching algorithm 
randomly assigned senders’ signals to receivers, with the 
constraints of limiting the frequency of pairing with a 
given sender—per block (≤ 3) and overall (≤ 8)—and the 
number of signals (≤ 3) from a given sender for the same 
ordinal trial (across participants). This method assigned 
signals for interpretation in the same relative time frame 
as they were produced (i.e., signals generated earlier 
were interpreted early in the session). It also allowed 
receivers to receive input from multiple random partners 
(as in Experiment 1), while preventing any particular 
sender’s signals from being unduly represented across a 
time slice.
The two conditions (sender, receiver) were conducted 
on different days. The instructions were similar to those 
given in Experiment 1 but modified to account for the 
new design. Participants also completed the same prac-
tice trials (in the same manner) as in Experiment 1 to 
familiarize them with the differing visual perspectives of 
each role. We specifically mentioned to participants that 
the number of axes was unrelated to the number of 
rewards.
The communication game was then played without 
live interaction. Participants in the sender condition gen-
erated all the signals that were later presented to partici-
pants in the receiver condition. In their session, receivers 
interpreted the signals previously generated by the send-
ers. No feedback on outcomes (i.e., the contents of axed 
boxes) was provided to the receivers (or, necessarily so, 
to the senders).
Results
Participants’ actions were coded into the same signaling 
categories as in Experiment 1. Within each condition 
(sender, receiver), the mean proportion of participants’ 
actions belonging to a signaling category was calculated 
for each trial type.
We focused our analyses on the same key trial types as 
in Experiment 1. On two-token trials, senders always 
marked the two boxes containing bananas (M = 1.00, 
SE = .0). On inversion trials, senders marked the scorpion 
a substantial proportion of times (M = .56, SE = .10, 95% 
CI = [.34, .78]), although, at other times, they marked one 
of the two boxes containing a banana (M = .42, SE = .10, 
95% CI = [.20, .64]). On wall trials, senders strongly 
favored marking one of the two boxes containing a 
banana (M = .77, SE = .08, 95% CI = [.60, .93]), as opposed 
to marking the box containing the scorpion (M = .23, 
SE = .08, 95% CI = [.07, .40]). And on one-ax trials, send-
ers chose to mark one of the bananas fairly often (M = .63, 
SE = .10, 95% CI = [.41, .84], marking the scorpion on the 
remainder of occasions (M = .38, SE = .10, 95% CI = [.16, 
.59]).
Figure 4 displays the mean proportion of trials on 
which senders and receivers used the odd-one-out sig-
nal. Senders’ odd-one-out signals were strongly affected 
by trial type, as indicated by a one-way repeated 
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Fig. 4. Mean proportion of trials on which participants used the odd-one-out signal 
in Experiment 2 as a function of trial type, separately for the sender and receiver 
conditions. Asterisks indicate significant differences between the critical trial type 
(inversion) and other trial types (*p < .01, **p < .001, ***p < .0001). Error bars repre-
sent ±1 SE.
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measures ANOVA, F(2.01, 30.11) = 12.20, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.45. Planned comparisons revealed that senders used 
odd-one-out signaling less often on two-token, wall, and 
one-ax trials than on inversion trials (mean difference 
between inversion and two-token trials = .56, 95% CI = 
[.34, .78], p < .001; between inversion and wall trials = .32, 
95% CI = [.11, .55], p = .007; and between inversion and 
one-ax trials = .19, 95% CI = [.05, .32], p = .009).
A generally similar pattern was seen for receivers, 
although the use of the odd-one-out signal on the inversion 
trials was nominally lower (M = .45, SE = .09, 95% CI = 
[.25, .65]) than for senders, despite being nominally pre-
ferred over marking one of the bananas (M = .33, SE = 
.08, 95% CI = [.15, .50]). In the absence of feedback or 
interactivity, a notable proportion of receivers’ actions on 
inversion trials consisted of alternate strategies (M = .22, 
SE = .08, 95% CI = [.06, .38]), which may have reflected 
participants’ reduced sense of engaging in a communica-
tive situation or a hedging between the mark-the-banana 
and odd-one-out conventions (e.g., receivers might select 
only one of the unmarked boxes but not the marked box, 
select one marked and one unmarked box, or select 
nothing). Consequently, receivers’ use of the odd-one-
out signal on inversion trials did not differ significantly 
from their use of the odd-one-out signal on one-ax trials 
(p > .250), in which alternate selection strategies (M = .02, 
SE = .02) were only negligibly deployed.
Because the inversion trial type was so critical, we 
additionally note that, in both conditions, the presence of 
the odd-one-out convention was substantial, with about 
72% of participants using the odd-one-out signal at least 
once on inversion trials.
Discussion
Odd-one-out signaling was attenuated in Experiment 2 
relative to Experiment 1, but it was nonetheless substan-
tially present and was transmitted significantly more 
often in the appropriate context, inversion trials, than on 
other types of trials. Thus, invertible signals emerged, 
despite controls that balanced potential trial-order effects 
and eliminated feedback. While differences between 
experiments were not intended to isolate the contribu-
tion of feedback (as additional design aspects were 
manipulated), participants’ selective adoption of the 
odd-one-out convention indicates that feedback is not 
necessary to account for invertible signals. Instead, inter-
action-based feedback may plausibly amplify usage of 
invertible signals in more naturalistic settings.
General Discussion
In a nonlinguistic paradigm, participants instantaneously 
created communicative conventions using the most mini-
mal signals. Signals of identical form carried contradictory 
meanings from moment to moment, and they did so flex-
ibly in response to the shared scene and task constraints. 
That is, the same signal of a placed token could signify 
something akin to either “here’s a banana, choose this” or 
“here’s a scorpion, don’t choose this” under almost identi-
cal circumstances—the same distribution of two bananas 
and one scorpion inside three boxes. Subtle changes in 
the common ground between senders and receivers, as read 
from visual cues in the virtual environment (axes, tokens, 
wall), allowed people to shift to more task-appropriate con-
ventions (e.g., where two bananas are obtainable).
Do invertible signals arise outside our experimental 
task? We suggest that this phenomenon is reminiscent of 
contronymy2 (Karaman, 2008) in natural language. A 
contronym is a word with opposing meanings. English 
examples include the verb dust, which may refer to either 
adding or, alternatively, removing fine particles from 
something (e.g., “dust the cake” vs. “dust the trophy”), 
and the adjective wicked, which may describe both 
extremely bad or extremely good things—the latter sense 
documented as far back as, at least, Fitzgerald’s This Side 
of Paradise (1920, p. 105). Because different uses of a 
contronym are identical in word form (both orthographi-
cally and phonologically) and syntactic word class, their 
meanings must be distinguished by context (linguistic or 
situational). Invertible signals in our paradigm are analo-
gous to contronyms with respect to having these same 
contradictory, context-dependent qualities. Their mean-
ing, too, is distinguished by the context (afforded by the 
visual scene). Invertibility is, more broadly, an example 
of ambiguity in a communication signal that is resolvable 
by context, which will be a feature of any coding system 
that is optimized to transmit as much information as pos-
sible (Piantadosi, Tily, & Gibson, 2012).
The contronymlike qualities of invertible signals may 
also have their counterpart in some instances of verbal 
irony (Gibbs, 2000; Roberts & Kreuz, 1994), in which an 
utterance’s meaning in the moment may contradict its 
more typical meaning. For example, someone may say 
“that’s just what we need” on hearing news of a setback 
instead of a breakthrough.
Verbal irony and contronyms are sharp manifestations 
of context dependence, as the meaning of the same word 
or utterance may entirely flip. Less extreme shifts of 
meaning, depending on context, pervade natural lan-
guage—as studied especially in pragmatics. Many tradi-
tional approaches in linguistics, philosophy, and 
psycholinguistics treat pragmatic factors as a sophisti-
cated late stage of analysis, following after semantic and 
syntactic processes (e.g., as computed after the decoding 
of literal meaning; e.g., Fodor, 1983; Grice, 1975). Cru-
cially, in contrast to this traditional view, pragmatic con-
text dependency was seen here in basic communicative 
behavior as intrinsic to the spontaneous creation of con-
ventions in our paradigm. Its appearance in our task 
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supports a central and foundational role for pragmatic 
constraints in determining the semantic content in human 
communication (see Clark, 1996; Levinson, 2000; Noveck 
& Sperber, 2004; Sperber & Wilson, 1986).
What type of accounts might explain the establish-
ment of conventions in our paradigm? One hypothesis, 
suggested for learning lexical conventions, is of a simple 
associative nature: Individuals learn word mappings by 
detecting reliable correlations between word labels and 
their corresponding entities in the world (Locke, 
1690/1964). Current approaches of this nature in the psy-
chological literature include associative cross-situational 
accounts (L. Smith & Yu, 2008; Yu & Smith, 2007), by 
which individuals track, across situations, co-occurrence 
frequencies of auditory sounds with visual percepts of 
objects. However, the instantaneous mapping of contra-
dictory meanings onto the same signal would seem puz-
zling from an associative perspective.
Adding to the puzzle is the observation that individu-
als in our task could not directly apply preexisting con-
ventions. Although their signaling behavior could 
arguably be seen as creating new precedents for the 
community, these behaviors did not become rigidly fixed 
for subsequent communication trials. Indeed, without 
any relevant reinforcement history in Experiment 2, par-
ticipants still inverted signal meanings in principled ways. 
The genesis of these conventions would implicate, 
instead, the key involvement of inferential processes. It 
seems plausible that inferential processes may, similarly, 
be required in resolving anaphora (he, it . . .), definite 
descriptions (the cup), deictic expressions (this, there, 
now, you . . .), names, and so on, in which speakers and 
hearers must coordinate on one of many possible refer-
ents on the basis of their common ground (Clark, 1996).
In particular, we suggest that the present results point 
beyond inferential processing in general3 and require 
what we term joint inference (by analogy with joint 
action and joint attention; Scaife & Bruner, 1975; Sebanz, 
Bekkering, & Knoblich, 2006). That is, participants faced 
a coordination problem that required them to converge 
on the same signal-meaning mapping from a vast array of 
possible mappings. As a solution, participants adopted 
the most sensible mapping that could be jointly inferred 
from the common ground and task constraints of the 
moment.
By contrast, the experimentally observed conventions 
cannot be explained as individualistically inferred, 
according to what is most rational or salient from one’s 
own role as sender or receiver. (Otherwise, for instance, 
senders would have incorporated privileged information 
about reward quantities on wall trials.) Nor are conven-
tions “other-regarding” solutions or predictions, as they 
are determined jointly from both parties’ constraints.
Notably, both parties’ joint inferences were instanta-
neously changing in response to the new communicative 
constraints of each task. The framework of joint inference 
accords with the perspective of viewing language and 
human communication as the study of joint action (Clark, 
1996; Croft, 2011; Galantucci, 2009). Joint inference may 
be important in understanding not just how spontaneous 
conventions arise but how they are continually modified 
and reshaped in new communicative contexts, and thus 
how they become entrenched into increasingly rich and 
stable communicative systems of gestures, facial expres-
sions, and signed and spoken natural language.
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Notes
1. Our argument does not depend on this choice of conven-
tion. The key question here is whether conventions of whatever 
form can change flexibly from moment to moment.
2. Contronymy is also called enantiosemy (Klégr, 2013).
3. For examples of productive models within the broader infer-
ential framework, see Bergen, Levy, and Goodman (2016); 
Frank and Goodman (2012); and N. J. Smith, Goodman, and 
Frank (2013).
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